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Football pointspread betting permits unusually direct examination of market behavior compared
to traditional asset markets. We present analysis of the pointspread market as a proxy for testing
efficiency and rational expectations in other financial markets. This paper proposes novel statistical
and economic tests to empirically appraise the rationality and efficiency of the National Football
League pointspread gambling market. Econometric analysis of a 2012-2019 sample reveals several
biased trends in pointspreads and deviations from rational expectations but fails to give evidence
against efficiency. These results indicate that rational expectations might not be necessary for
markets to retain long-run efficiency and suggest potential compatibility between decision models
incorporating bounded rationality and those which assume neoclassical market efficiency.
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1 Introduction
It is often useful to empirically test concepts in eco-
nomic theory. Developments in behavioral economics,
combined with the 2007-2008 financial crisis, have cast
considerable doubt on the theories of rational expecta-
tions and efficient markets. However, empirically test-
ing the rationality and efficiency of traditional financial
markets is often difficult or impossible.
The NFL pointspread gambling market’s finite-
horizon structure permits direct comparisons of observ-
able ex post asset values with ex ante prices, enabling
per se empirical asset pricing tests. The pointspread
market thus avoids the “joint hypothesis problem”
present in other financial markets. This advantageous
feature, combined with the repeatedly noted (Pankoff
1968, Gandar et al. 1988, Levitt 2004, Lacey 1990,
Gray & Gray 1997) similarities in structure between
the pointspread and securities markets, offers an ideal
environment for examining the theories of rational ex-
pectations and efficient markets.
To date, no firm conclusion exists concerning the
rational expectations or efficiency of the pointspread
market. Some authors claim to detect profit opportu-
nities, while others offer evidence to the contrary. This
paper seeks to ascertain what, if any, biased trends ex-
ist within the behavior of prices in the NFL pointspread
betting market. We present, to date, one of the largest
published datasets of NFL pointspread betting action,
and test more betting strategies than any other au-
thors. Furthermore, we explore the shortcomings of
Pankoff’s (1968) “partial rationality” model and offer
improvements on his testing methods.
The data indicate that the NFL pointspread bet-
ting market’s behavior is consistent with efficiency, de-
spite the presence of nonrational expectations. Both
pure statistical and direct economic tests fail to give
decisive evidence of market inefficiency, while simul-
taneously indicating nonrational expectations and bi-
ased gambling behavior. Ordinarily, rational expec-
tations of agents are a prerequisite for economic effi-
ciency. However, given the persistent failure of port-
folio managers to outperform market indexes despite
well-documented behavioral biases present in financial
markets, along with the work of authors such as Sum-
mers (1986) and Gulko (2005), these results support
the growing body of literature that suggests irrational-
ity might not be mutually exclusive with an efficient
markets hypothesis (EMH) economic framework.
The sections of this paper proceed in the follow-
ing manner. Section 2 describes the operation of
the pointspread market. Section 3 offers statistical
and economic tests of rationality and efficiency in the
pointspread gambling market. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 The NFL Gambling Market
Sports gambling is a large and high-profile industry in
the United States. The American Gaming Association
estimates annual gross betting on American football
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games to exceed $95 billion (Purdum 2015), which Na-
tional Football League pointspread wagering primarily
constitutes.
The pointspread system operates in the following
manner. At the start of the betting period, bookmak-
ers establish uniform odds on an upcoming game, con-
sisting of a betting line, PS, called the “pointspread”,
which estimates the game’s result1, and payout odds
for each team, ω, which determine the ratio between
money wagered and net payouts for a bet on that
team2. Gamblers then bet on teams to “cover the
spread”, that is, to outperform the established line.
During the betting period, bookmakers may nonuni-
formly adjust both the offered pointspreads and pay-
out odds until the beginning of the respective games,
after which no wagers are taken. The net profit to a
gambler who wagers δ dollars on a team with a margin
of victory MV will be:
π =

(ω − 1)δ MV > PS
0 MV = PS
−δ MV < PS
 {1}
As a direct consequence of Eq. {1}, the wins-
to-bets ratio p required (ignoring pushes, i.e., where
MV = PS) for a gambler to break even, assuming wa-
ger amounts are a constant δ over n wagers, will be:
E(π) = np(ω − 1)δ + n(1− p)(−δ)
= (pω − 1)nδ = 0⇒
pω − 1 = 0⇒ p = 1
ω
{2}
Notice that p is just the implied probability for a
given outcome when ω is fair. So, a gambler that gen-
erates a long-run p̂ > 1
ω
has discovered pointspread
mispricing, as ω̂ = 1
p̂
< ω is that the odds offered for
the wagered-on outcomes exceed those implied by the
ex post observed outcome probabilities.
To date, previous authors have apparently ignored
real-world bookmaking arrangements, where ω is al-
lowed to fluctuate, instead preferring to fix ω = 21
11
.
While this is the modal value for ω in our sample, nearly
70 percent (2836 / 4096) of possible wagers had a dif-
ferent value of ω. This heretofore unconsidered source
of variation in pointspread pricing is a crucial factor in
wager profitability, as we show above. Therefore, we
incorporate ω into our empirical tests found in Section
3 as to develop a more robust evaluation of rationality
and efficiency in the pointspread market. Note that
throughout our analysis, we exclude “pushed” games
from the data, as is common in the pointspread litera-
ture.
3 Empirical Methodology and
Results
We present pooled cross-sectional data consisting of
pointspreads, payout odds, wager proportions, final
scores, and additional fundamental factors (which we
discuss in Section 3.2) from each game in the 2012-
2019 NFL regular seasons, a total sample size of 2048
games. We use pointspreads and payout odds quoted
from Bovada, one of the largest online sportsbooks.
We use wager proportions reported by Wunderdog.com,
which aggregates real-money betting action data across
the highest-trafficked online sportsbooks, including Bo-
vada. Game dates, times, and final scores were taken
from NFL.com’s official schedule webpage. We also uti-
lize FiveThirtyEight.com’s NFL Elo ratings, which are
an index of team strength.
3.1 Direct Economic Tests
The development of systematic profit opportunities in
the pointspread market violates the efficient markets
hypothesis. The most direct means of evaluating mar-
ket efficiency is to conduct profitability tests of hypo-
thetical gambling strategies.
Previous work in the pointspread literature typ-
ically proposes several novel strategies, and evaluates
their profitability strictly in-sample. This standard ap-
proach immediately encounters several issues. Firstly,
it is impossible to examine the entire set of possible
pointspread gambling strategies. Failure to detect prof-
itable betting rules may not indicate market efficiency,
but rather that the authors selected the wrong strate-
1Typically, game results are positive (i.e., the winner has a positive margin of victory), and betting lines are negative
(i.e., the favorite has a negative pointspread). To avoid confusion, this paper refers to betting lines as positive, in the
same manner as game results.
2Payout odds can be expressed in several different units; we report odds ratios using the decimal system. For an
excellent summary and comparison of the decimal and other competing odds units, see Cortis (2015).
2
gies to test. However, the question of which strate-
gies to test is not altogether straightforward. Testing
a wide enough array of strategies will inevitably result
in a few being significantly profitable due to pure sta-
tistical variance. Some authors (e.g. Tryfos et al. 1984)
attempt to address this by analyzing the rejection rate
of the entire set of strategies they test as compared to
various α levels, but this does not entirely resolve the
issue either; such rejection rates are likewise greatly
affected by selection bias. For instance, suppose the
pointspread market currently underprices home teams,
but an author only tests 1 strategy related to home-
field advantage and 100 others relating to factors which
are correctly priced- the author will have accuractely
detected mispricing, but may incorrectly conclude, due
to the low rate of discovery of significantly profitable
strategies, that the pointspread market is efficient. Ad-
ditionally, some strategies may overlap (e.g., betting
exclusively on underdogs, and exclusively on home un-
derdogs), and others may be able to be combined from
or split into multiple distinct strategies (e.g. betting
on teams with PS ∈ [5, 10] might be split into the sep-
arate strategies betting on teams with PS ∈ [5, 7] and
with with PS ∈ (7, 10], respectively). For many such
strategies, there is no a priori reason to treat these to-
gether or separately; testing many narrowly-applicable
strategies is likely to result in small sample size and low
statistical power, while testing a few broad strategies
may miss profitable rules which are only detectable at
finer resolutions. Worse still, basing our conclusions for
or against efficiency upon rejection rates forces them to
principally depend upon detection of profitable strate-
gies and that we do not select too many unprofitable
strategies ex ante.
A more rigorous method of evaluating strategy
profitability which avoids the aforementioned issues
would be to pre-screen each betting rule’s profitability
with a sample separate from the main analysis. Those
strategies which rejected the null hypothesis in the first
sample would then be subject to testing in the main
sample. If the rejection rate of the primary analysis
exceeds α levels, then we may be confident to have de-
tected a violation of the EMH. Alternatively, if the ob-
served rejection rate is less than α, then we conclude
that any previous detection of “profitable” strategies
was only due to statistical chance. Performing tests of
efficiency in this manner will guarantee that ex ante
strategy specification does not bias rejection rates.
A wide survey of the pointspread-EMH literature
reveals 141 distinct strategies proposed by previous au-
thors3, 39 of which yield in-sample wins-to-bets ra-
tios significantly different from pure randomness (i.e.,
p = 0.5) under a two-sided binomial test. There is
considerable variety in both the technical mechanisms
these strategies use and their theoretical justifications
(see further discussion below). These past results will
serve as a sufficient screening process for the method-
ology described above. For an exhaustive list of the
qualifying strategies, and the respective results of pre-
vious authors’ tests, see Table 1.
The qualifying strategies generally attempt to ex-
ploit one or more of four main speculated inefficiencies:
A) overreaction to historical performances, B) biased
price movements that develop during the betting pe-
riod, C) underpricing of home teams, and D) under-
pricing of underdogs. Variations on contrarian betting
rules comprise a large class of strategies tested in the
literature: Vergin & Scriabin (1978), Vergin (2001) and
Woodland & Woodland (2000) note several profitable
strategies of this variety, while Fodor et al. (2013) and
Davis et al. (2015) identify sizable inefficiencies due to
early-season overreactions by the pointspread market.
Price-movement strategies are effectively contrarian as
well, since they bet against trends in pricing and bet-
ting action, although they are more concerned with
present market sentiment than the former class of bet-
ting rules, which target teams that underperform his-
torical market pricing. Paul & Weinbach (2007, 2011)
and Gandar et al. (1988) all discovered multiple price-
movement strategies which were profitable over their
respective samples. Underdog and home team strate-
gies have a long, but more mixed track record, with
some authors (Golec & Tamarkin 1991, Gray & Gray
1997, Levitt 2004) reporting small but significant un-
derpricing, while others (Vergin & Scriabin 1978, Gan-
dar et al. 1988, Tryfos et al. 1984) find more conflicting
evidence.
It is well-known that the number of successful wa-
gers s which a particular strategy yields over n total
3We review strategies proposed by Badarinathi & Kochman (1996), Gandar et al. (1988), Gray & Gray (1997), Golec
& Tamarkin (1991), Lacey (1990), Levitt (2004), Tryfos et al. (1984), Vergin & Scriabin (1978), Paul & Weinbach (2007,
2011), Vergin (2001), Fodor et al. (2013), Davis et al. (2015), Shank (2018) and Woodland & Woodland (2000), excepting
those which utilize pointspread advantage, a technique that place bets across several sportsbooks simultaneously, and has
to date only been explored theoretically in the pointspread literature.
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Table 1- Previous authors’ results
Rule Authors n p̂ H2 p-value
Bet on teams that are:
underdogs Golec & Tamarkin (1991) 3154 0.524 0.01∗∗∗
Gray & Gray (1997) 4042 0.526 0.00∗∗∗
Levitt (2004) 4793 0.518 0.01∗∗
Tryfos et al. (1984) 1391 0.534 0.01∗∗
favorites by ≤ 3 points Levitt (2004) 1559 0.522 0.08∗
favorites by ≤ 5 points Gandar et al. (1988) 689 0.543 0.03∗∗
Tryfos et al. (1984) 656 0.534 0.09∗
underdogs by > 5 but ≤ 10 points Vergin & Scriabin (1978) 407 0.543 0.09∗
underdogs by > 5 points Tryfos et al. (1984) 735 0.535 0.07∗
underdogs by > 15 points Vergin & Scriabin (1978) 50 0.640 0.06∗
underdogs, and have ≤ 45% of betting action Paul & Weinbach (2007) 195 0.574 0.04∗∗
underdogs, and have ≤ 35% of betting action Paul & Weinbach (2007) 136 0.610 0.01∗∗
Paul & Weinbach (2011) 290 0.566 0.03∗∗
underdogs, and have ≤ 30% of betting action Paul & Weinbach (2007) 103 0.641 0.01∗∗∗
Paul & Weinbach (2011) 234 0.585 0.01∗∗
underdogs, and have ≤ 25% of betting action Paul & Weinbach (2011) 162 0.580 0.05∗∗
underdogs, in the first half of the season Levitt (2004) 2209 0.523 0.03∗∗
underdogs, and are playing at home Gray & Gray (1997) 1307 0.546 0.00∗∗∗
Golec & Tamarkin (1991) 1115 0.556 0.00∗∗∗
Levitt (2004) 1483 0.533 0.01∗∗
playing at home Golec & Tamarkin (1991) 3154 0.515 0.09∗
Bet on teams whose pointspread, during the betting period:
decreases Gandar et al. (1988) 874 0.549 0.00∗∗∗
decreases, when in the previous week a Gandar et al. (1988) 365 0.570 0.01∗∗∗
majority of pointspreads were more
accurate at the end of the betting
period than at the beginning
decreases by ≥ 1 point, and are not playing Shank (2018) 599 0.563 0.00∗∗∗
at home
Bet against teams which in their previous game:
won by ≥ 10 points Vergin (2001) 1507 0.478 0.10∗
won by ≥ 20 points Vergin (2001) 591 0.464 0.08∗
Lacey (1990) 122 0.590 0.06∗
lost, whose opponents lost their previous Davis et al. (2015) 58 0.707 0.00∗∗∗
game, and are favorites, in Week 2
covered by ≥ 10 points as a favorite, Gandar et al. (1988) 167 0.581 0.04∗∗
and are favorites
Bet on teams which in their previous game:
failed to cover by ≥ 15 points Vergin (2001) 761 0.531 0.10∗
lost, and are underdogs Woodland & Woodland (2000) 1540 0.526 0.04∗∗
failed to cover, and are underdogs Woodland & Woodland (2000) 1410 0.525 0.07∗
lost, failed to cover, and are underdogs Woodland & Woodland (2000) 1204 0.527 0.06∗
Bet against teams which in their previous 2 games:
won twice Woodland & Woodland (2000) 1303 0.526 0.07∗
won twice, and are favorites Woodland & Woodland (2000) 861 0.532 0.07∗
covered twice Lacey (1990) 320 0.578 0.01∗∗∗
Bet on teams which in their previous 2 games:
lost twice Lacey (1990) 320 0.425 0.01∗∗∗
lost twice, and are not playing at home Shank (2018) 502 0.540 0.08∗
Bet against teams averaging the highest margin of victory over:
their previous 2 games Gandar et al. (1988) 79 0.608 0.07∗
their previous 4 games Vergin & Scriabin (1978) 57 0.333 0.02∗∗
either their previous 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 games Vergin (2001) 954 0.466 0.04∗∗
Bet against teams averaging the highest cover margin over:
their previous 2 games Vergin (2001) 189 0.418 0.03∗∗
their previous 3 games Gandar et al. (1988) 71 0.620 0.06∗
their previous 4 games Vergin & Scriabin (1978) 59 0.373 0.07∗
either their previous 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 games Vergin (2001) 940 0.451 0.00∗∗∗
Bet against teams which in the previous year:
covered 7 more games than they failed Vergin (2001) 259 0.564 0.05∗∗
to cover, or whose opponents covered
7 less games than they failed to cover
made the playoffs and whose opponents Lacey (1990) 327 0.450 0.08∗
failed to make the playoffs
made the playoffs and whose opponents Fodor et al. (2013) 59 0.644 0.04∗∗
failed to make the playoffs, in Week 1
∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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wagers follows a binomial distribution. What is less
clear, however, is what null wins-to-bets ratio p0 should
be used to generate said distribution. The standard
choices utilized by previous authors are p0 = 0.5 and
p0 = 11/21. However, these fail to consider the vari-
ation in ω as discussed in Section 2. Since the p0 set
under a null hypothesis of gambler unprofitably is di-
rectly dependent upon the offered odds ratios, we posit
that correct specification of p0 should instead be made
based upon the distribution of ω. This claim is sup-
ported by the data, as a chi-squared goodness-of-fit
test was unable to reject that the observed cover prob-
abilities were equivalent to those implied by ω (p =
0.15).
The most appropriate mechanism for modeling
odds ratios such as ω is to fit a beta prime distribution
to the data such that ω − 1 ∼ β′(α̂, β̂), which would
imply (by Eq. {2}) that p ∼ β(α̂, β̂)4. Conveniently,
the resulting beta-binomial tests are also tests of prof-
itability, since if the observed p̂ is significantly greater
than the p0 implied by the offered payout odds, then
bookmakers must be offering ω greater than optimal
and allowing bettors profit opportunities.
Under the assumed beta-binomial distribution,
when each wager uses a constant δ = 1, the probability
of observing a given betting strategy which wins s out
of n wagers under a null hypothesis of unprofitability
is:







B(α̂+ k, β̂ + n− k)
B(α̂, β̂)
{3}
In addition to a beta-binomial test of H0, we
present for comparison binomial tests against the hy-
potheses H1 : p̂ ≤ 1121 and H2 : p̂ =
1
2
. H1 is equiv-
alent to H0 under the hypothetical scenario where all
ω = 21
11
, and H2 is that the given strategy does not
explain any variation in MV − PS. Binomial tests
are more precise than the Z-tests utilized in much of
the literature. While binomially distributed random
variables do converge to normality as n → ∞, mod-
ern computers and statistical software enable fast and
accurate computation of binomial p-values, an advan-
tage authors of the more dated parts of the pointspread
literature did not enjoy. Therefore, we prefer to uti-
lize binomial probabilities for significance testing of
pointspread betting strategy profitability. The results
of our tests are offered below in Tables 2 and 3, which
report betting strategy profitability against lines at the
start and end of the betting period, respectively.
Of the 71 total strategies tested (32 against open-
ing lines, 39 against closing lines), none were profitable
at the α = 0.05 level, and only one was profitable at
the α = 0.1 level. Under the null hypothesis that
no strategy is profitable in the long-run, we expect
(α)(n) rejections of H0 due to statistical noise. At
90 and 95 percent confidence, the expected number
of rejections are 7.1 and 3.6, respectively. These re-
sults are clearly consistent with market efficiency and
cast significant doubt on previous authors’ claims of
discovering profitable betting strategies. Interestingly,
the single strategy which was significantly profitable
at the 90 percent confidence level, betting closing lines
against teams with the highest MV over their previous
4 games, was insignificantly so when using the standard
binomial test against H1. Indeed, tests of H0 generally
yield lower p-values than tests of H1, indicating that
our beta-binomial test may be more sensitive to suc-
cessful betting rules than the regular binomial tests.
However, this difference, while significant (p < 0.001),
is relatively small in most cases, including for the afore-
mentioned profitable strategy, and does not affect the
overall harmony of the data with a conclusion of mar-
ket efficiency.
The outlook of the data is considerably murkier
when considering the (non)randomness of wagered-
upon outcomes under a given betting strategy. Bino-
mial tests rejected the null of H2 at the α = 0.01,
α = 0.05, and α = 0.1 levels 0, 3, and 10 times, re-
spectively. While at the 95 percent (3.6 expected re-
jections) and 99 percent confidence (0.7 expected rejec-
tions) levels, we rejectH2 fewer times than expected, at
90 percent confidence (7.1 expected rejections), we ob-
serve over 40% more rejections than expected. Further
complicating matters, every strategy which yielded a
p̂ significantly different from randomness was only so
when betting against closing lines. While it would be
statistically inappropriate to re-specify our selection of
betting strategies post hoc, if we had limited consider-
ation of strategies to betting against closing lines, the
4Upon investigation of the data, it is immediately clear that bookmaker odds-setting behavior is such that neither ω
nor the implied cover probability 1
ω
follow any well-known probability distributions. We select the beta prime distribution
for hypothesis testing due to its (relatively) closer approximation of ω as compared to alternative distributions, and for
its well-established statistical properties for modeling probabilities and odds ratios.
5
Table 2- Betting Strategies vs. the Opening Line
P-values
Rule n p̂ π/n H0 H1 H2
Bet on teams that are:
underdogs 1911 0.509 -0.029 0.86 0.91 0.46
underdogs by ≤ 3 points 695 0.495 -0.055 0.91 0.94 0.82
underdogs by ≤ 5 points 1092 0.506 -0.033 0.84 0.88 0.69
underdogs by > 5 but ≤ 10 points 658 0.521 -0.004 0.54 0.57 0.29
underdogs by > 5 points 819 0.512 -0.022 0.73 0.77 0.53
underdogs by > 15 points 17 0.588 0.131 0.22 0.39 0.63
underdogs, in the first half of the season 900 0.517 -0.013 0.64 0.68 0.33
underdogs, and are playing at home 629 0.493 -0.061 0.92 0.94 0.75
playing at home 1985 0.487 -0.072 1.00 1.00 0.24
Bet against teams which in their previous game:
won by ≥ 10 points 874 0.491 -0.061 0.96 0.98 0.61
won by ≥ 20 points 360 0.483 -0.075 0.92 0.94 0.56
lost, whose opponents lost their previous 30 0.567 0.078 0.26 0.39 0.58
game, and are favorites, in Week 2
covered by ≥ 10 points as a favorite, 253 0.482 -0.080 0.89 0.92 0.62
and are favorites
Bet on teams which in their previous game:
failed to cover by ≥ 15 points 480 0.488 -0.069 0.93 0.95 0.62
lost, and are underdogs 1059 0.497 -0.052 0.94 0.96 0.85
failed to cover, and are underdogs 985 0.506 -0.034 0.84 0.88 0.75
lost, failed to cover, and are underdogs 883 0.502 -0.041 0.88 0.91 0.95
Bet against teams which in their previous 2 games:
won twice 936 0.517 -0.012 0.63 0.67 0.31
won twice, and are favorites 615 0.528 0.009 0.40 0.42 0.17
covered twice 808 0.507 -0.031 0.79 0.83 0.70
Bet on teams which in their previous 2 games:
lost twice 961 0.492 -0.060 0.96 0.98 0.65
lost twice, and are not playing at home 451 0.510 -0.025 0.70 0.74 0.71
Bet against teams averaging the highest margin of victory over:
their previous 2 games 119 0.487 -0.066 0.76 0.81 0.85
their previous 4 games 106 0.566 0.082 0.17 0.22 0.21
either their previous 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 games 308 0.503 -0.036 0.74 0.78 0.95
Bet against teams averaging the highest cover margin over:
their previous 2 games 115 0.496 -0.050 0.69 0.76 1.00
their previous 3 games 109 0.514 -0.016 0.55 0.62 0.85
their previous 4 games 107 0.523 0.001 0.47 0.54 0.70
either their previous 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 games 322 0.509 -0.025 0.67 0.72 0.78
Bet against teams which in the previous year:
covered 7 more games than they failed 214 0.509 -0.025 0.64 0.69 0.84
to cover, or whose opponents covered
7 less games than they failed to cover
made the playoffs and whose opponents 942 0.485 -0.073 0.98 0.99 0.38
failed to make the playoffs
made the playoffs and whose opponents 56 0.500 -0.046 0.59 0.69 1.00
failed to make the playoffs, in Week 1
The beta distribution used in tests of H0 was β(α̂ = 1856.936, β̂ = 1687.538)
∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3- Betting Strategies vs. the Closing Line
P-values
Rule n p̂ π/n H0 H1 H2
Bet on teams that are:
underdogs 1952 0.520 -0.004 0.56 0.64 0.08∗
favorites by ≤ 3 points 655 0.513 -0.018 0.64 0.72 0.53
favorites by ≤ 5 points 1067 0.522 0.000 0.52 0.56 0.16
underdogs by > 5 but ≤ 10 points 699 0.526 0.010 0.45 0.46 0.17
underdogs by > 5 points 885 0.518 -0.008 0.59 0.66 0.31
underdogs by > 15 points 26 0.500 -0.040 0.52 0.67 1.00
underdogs, and have ≤ 45% of betting action 1377 0.524 0.001 0.50 0.52 0.08∗
underdogs, and have ≤ 35% of betting action 772 0.543 0.034 0.24 0.15 0.02∗∗
underdogs, and have ≤ 30% of betting action 491 0.536 0.019 0.34 0.32 0.12
underdogs, and have ≤ 25% of betting action 234 0.547 0.034 0.26 0.26 0.17
underdogs, in the first half of the season 921 0.543 0.042 0.23 0.13 0.01∗∗
underdogs, and are playing at home 727 0.516 -0.008 0.60 0.68 0.41
playing at home 1972 0.491 -0.057 0.92 1.00 0.46
Bet on teams whose pointspread, during the betting period:
decreases 1577 0.521 0.000 0.55 0.61 0.11
decreases, when in the previous week a 895 0.528 0.014 0.42 0.40 0.09∗
majority of pointspreads were more
accurate at the end of the betting
period than at the beginning
decreases by ≥ 1 point, and are not playing 478 0.550 0.056 0.19 0.13 0.03∗∗
at home
Bet against teams which in their previous game:
won by ≥ 10 points 870 0.503 -0.037 0.77 0.89 0.87
won by ≥ 20 points 364 0.505 -0.037 0.70 0.77 0.88
lost, whose opponents lost their previous 31 0.548 0.036 0.33 0.46 0.72
game, and are favorites, in Week 2
covered by ≥ 10 points as a favorite, 279 0.495 -0.055 0.78 0.85 0.90
and are favorites
Bet on teams which in their previous game:
failed to cover by ≥ 15 points 465 0.501 -0.043 0.76 0.85 1.00
lost, and are underdogs 1095 0.516 -0.013 0.61 0.71 0.30
failed to cover, and are underdogs 1035 0.527 0.008 0.45 0.44 0.09∗
lost, failed to cover, and are underdogs 904 0.524 0.004 0.48 0.50 0.15
Bet against teams which in their previous 2 games:
won twice 937 0.530 0.016 0.39 0.36 0.07∗
won twice, and are favorites 641 0.532 0.019 0.38 0.35 0.11
covered twice 777 0.530 0.017 0.40 0.37 0.10∗
Bet on teams which in their previous 2 games:
lost twice 952 0.504 -0.037 0.77 0.89 0.82
lost twice, and are not playing at home 449 0.521 -0.013 0.52 0.56 0.40
Bet against teams averaging the highest margin of victory over:
their previous 2 games 122 0.541 0.041 0.34 0.39 0.42
their previous 4 games 105 0.590 0.134 0.09∗ 0.10 0.08∗
either their previous 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 games 313 0.534 0.020 0.37 0.39 0.26
Bet against teams averaging the highest cover margin over:
their previous 2 games 117 0.564 0.087 0.19 0.22 0.20
their previous 3 games 111 0.532 0.018 0.41 0.47 0.57
their previous 4 games 106 0.528 0.013 0.43 0.50 0.63
either their previous 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 games 329 0.541 0.033 0.29 0.28 0.15
Bet against teams which in the previous year:
covered 7 more games than they failed 151 0.530 0.019 0.42 0.47 0.52
to cover, or whose opponents covered
7 less games than they failed to cover
made the playoffs and whose opponents 938 0.496 -0.051 0.85 0.96 0.82
failed to make the playoffs
made the playoffs and whose opponents 58 0.517 -0.008 0.49 0.59 0.90
failed to make the playoffs, in Week 1
The beta distribution used in tests of H0 was β(α̂ = 309.484, β̂ = 281.332)
∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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data would clearly support a conclusion that PS ad-
mits wagers which are significantly more likely to win
than not. This does not indicate, however, that the
probability of such wagers is high enough to ensure
positive profits, as once we account for ω (such as in
tests of H0), the data instead supports the null of un-
profitability. As it stands, whether bets against PS
are equally likely win as to lose is wholly unclear, but
we cannot ignore the possibility that closing lines are
biased.
These findings are quite surprising given many pre-
vious authors’ results. For example, the strong biases
in early-season pointspreads as documented by Fodor
et al. (2013) and Davis et al. (2015) are not replicated
in our sample. Similarly, strategies that speculate on
biased trends in betting action of the variety proposed
by Gandar et al. (1988) and Paul & Weinbach (2007,
2011) are far less profitable (and more importantly, in-
significantly so) in our sample as compared to the au-
thors’ original tests. This is not to say that such biases
are not present in PS itself, as evidenced by the non-
negligible number of rejections of H2; however, simply
considering the actual payouts of ω resolves these ap-
parent “inefficiencies” discovered by previous authors.
In this respect, our results indicate rigorous out-of-
sample testing of betting strategies using real-market
data is crucial when assessing the efficiency of the NFL
pointspread market, lest we too hastily conclude the
existence of profitable betting strategies.
3.2 A Regression Test of Efficiency
That pointspread gamblers behave in a manner consis-
tent with rational expectations is that their conditional
expectations are equivalent to true expectations. We
explore the rationality (or lack thereof) of bettors in
this sense via a regression test, which we present be-
low.
The earliest and most common approach to recov-
ering expectations from the pointspread data is a “par-
tial rationality” test of the variety proposed by Pankoff
(1968). The partial rationality method interprets PS
as gamblers’ conditional expectations, and MV as true
expectations. Often, these partial rationality tests use
a simple OLS regression test with MV and PS as
the dependent and independent variables, respectively
(e.g. Pankoff 1968, Gandar et al. 1988, Sauer 1998), al-
though some authors also insert fundamental factors as
independent variables into the partial rationality equa-
tion (e.g. Golec & Tamarkin 1991, Shank 2018, Sauer
et al. 1988).
However, there are both theoretical and practical
considerations which suggest these partial rationality
tests are misspecified. Firstly, the pointspread gam-
bler, unlike in other securities markets, faces a binary
outcome: a wager, once placed, either wins, or loses,
and offers a constant net payout in either case. No
matter how large MV − PS is, the gambler is only
concerned that its value is positive, and profits equally
for all such outcomes. Mathematically, the profit-
maximizing gambler is interested in the value of the
cumulative distribution function of MV evaluated at
PS, not the expected values of MV and PS. There-
fore, expectations in the pointspread market are better
characterized by probabilities, not point-values. Addi-
tionally, Levitt (2004), supported by more recent au-
thors (Simmons et al. 2011, Paul & Weinbach 2007,
2011), presents convincing evidence that bookmakers
intentionally avoid setting market-clearing PS. Thus,
PS may not accurately aggregate market sentiment,
and instead only reflect bookmakers’ expectations, not
those of gamblers. Finally, these partial rationality
tests have consistently failed to detect deviations from
rational expectations, leading several authors to con-
clude that these tests are statistically weak (e.g. Gan-
dar et al. 1988, Sauer et al. 1988, Sauer 1998).
Pointspread markets’ function permits a more di-
rect and better-suited measurement of rational expec-
tations. We interpret the proportion of betting action
a team receives BA as the pointspread market’s con-
ditional expectation of the likelihood that team covers
their game, and the binary outcome CO of the game
(i.e., 1 if the team covers, and 0 if the team fails to
cover) as true expectations. So, on average, we expect
CO and BA to be equivalent. Moreover, if gamblers
have rational expectations, then no subset of publicly
available information should be able to explain CO
against BA. Stated differently, rational expectations
dictates that no variable(s) should be able to predict
CO−BA. Therefore, we derive the following regression
equation:
CO −BA = b0 +B ·Θ + ε {4}
Where b0 is a constant coefficient, B is a vector of
coefficients for the vector of explanatory variables Θ,
and ε is a residual. Under our null hypothesis of ra-
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tional expectations, b0 and B should be just zero and
the zero vector, respectively. The natural choice of sig-
nificance test is therefore the F-test of each regression
coefficient’s joint equality with zero. If any indepen-
dent variables separately or jointly explain variation
in CO − BA, then pointspread gamblers have failed
to fully and/or correctly incorporate available informa-
tion into their bets, a violation of rational expectations.
We select several fundamental and technical fac-
tors for Θ. The technical variables we include are:
PS, the net change in PS during the betting period,
1
ω
for both the home and away teams, and BA it-
self. The fundamental variable we include are: the im-
plied pointspread generated by each team’s FiveThir-
tyEight Elo rating (an index of team strength), the
host’s implied cover probability generated by the Elo
pointspread5, binary dummy variables for each team’s
participation in the previous season’s playoffs, the
number of days of rest of each team since their most re-
cent game, the time zone of each team’s home location
(defined as 0 for teams in the Eastern Time Zone, 1
for Central Time, etc.), the weekday of the game, and
a categorical variable for the EST start time of the
game (i.e., morning, early afternoon, late afternoon,
and evening). We present the results of our regression
test in Table 4. Note that we regress for home teams
only, to avoid letting the data enter our sample twice.
The results of our test strongly indicate nonrational
expectations. PS, BA, and the Elo-implied cover prob-
ability are all significant and robust at the 95% con-
fidence level, as is the model as a whole. The most
striking result is the extremely negative coefficient on
BA, which implies that with other factors considered,
a 4% increase in betting action is associated with an
approximate 1% decrease in a team’s cover probability.
While this is the clearest indication of nonrational gam-
bler expectations, the other significant variables sup-
port a conclusion of nonrationality as well. Gamblers
appear to not fully account for the likelihood of relative
strengths of each team, as evidenced by the strongly
positive Elo-implied cover probability coefficient, al-
though curiously, the coefficient on the Elo-implied PS
is actually negative, indicating both that the former
coefficient may be biased upwards and that the Elo
rating index interacts nonlinearly with CO − BA. In-
terestingly, the coefficient on PS is positive, indicating
that pointspread gamblers may actually not be betting
on favorites enough, all else considered. This is quite
surprising given crowds’ strong and well-documented
favorite-bias in the pointspread market
Table 4- Rational expectations regression
Sample 2012-2019 2012-2015















Elo-implied PS -0.045∗ -0.029
(0.024) (0.026)
Elo-implied P (MV > PS) 1.424∗∗ 0.964
(0.725) (0.810)
Host made playoffs 0.022 0.064∗
(0.026) (0.038)
Visitor made playoffs -0.007 -0.041
(0.027) (0.039)
Host days of rest -0.009 -0.007
(0.006) (0.009)
Visitor days of rest -0.007 0.000
(0.006) (0.008)
Host Time Zone -0.005 -0.012
(0.013) (0.019)




















F (b0 = 0, B = ~0) 14.48∗∗∗ 9.26∗∗∗
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
5See Silver, Boice & Paine (2014) for a discussion of FiveThirtyEight’s Elo methodology.
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(e.g. Simmons et al. 2011, Gray & Gray 1997, Golec &
Tamarkin 1991, Levitt 2004, Paul & Weinbach 2007,
2011); in our sample, favorites attracted an average of
57.6% of all betting action, despite that favorites only
covered in 47.8% of their games. It may be instead that
while bettors prefer betting on favorites, they simply
choose the wrong favorites when gambling.
Identification of the factors which lead pointspread
gamblers to overbet on suboptimal wagers is less
straighforward. We have detected a few sources of
variation in CO−BA, however, the model’s relatively
low R2 value suggests that factors not observed in our
model are responsible for crowds’ failure to properly in-
corporate available information into their choice of wa-
gers. The magnitude of the coefficient on BA reinforces
this conclusion; a negative coefficient on BA indicates
that crowds would still be betting incorrectly, even
after adjusting for the other observed variables (as-
suming BA is non-causal on CO, which seems likely).
Pointspread outcomes appear to be fairly noisy, so
while additional exploration of the pointspread “fac-
tor zoo” could prove fruitful, discovery of additional
explanainers of CO may be equally difficult. As a
practical consideration, until such factors are identi-
fied, our results suggest that betting strategies of the
variety proposed by Paul & Weinbach (2007, 2011) are
the most likely to be profitable as compared to the
currently available alternatives.
Table 5- Regression strategy profitability
Betting strategy Bets p̂ π H0 p-value
In-sample
ĈO ≥ 0.50 987 0.565 66.88 0.05∗
ĈO ≥ 0.52 774 0.576 66.07 0.03∗∗
ĈO ≥ 0.54 593 0.595 70.78 0.01∗∗∗
ĈO ≥ 0.56 430 0.616 66.87 0.05∗∗∗
ĈO ≥ 0.58 285 0.639 56.11 0.00∗∗∗
ĈO ≥ 0.60 196 0.658 44.91 0.00∗∗∗
Out-of-sample
ĈO ≥ 0.50 985 0.517 -19.16 0.60
ĈO ≥ 0.52 777 0.510 -27.80 0.69
ĈO ≥ 0.54 601 0.516 -15.64 0.60
ĈO ≥ 0.56 424 0.512 -14.62 0.63
ĈO ≥ 0.58 308 0.516 -8.79 0.57
ĈO ≥ 0.60 207 0.512 -7.92 0.59
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
These above deviations from the behavior predicted
by rational expectations, while strong, do not appear
to create profit opportunities. We use the above lin-
ear probability model, re-estimated over an abbrevi-
ated 2012-2015 sample, to predict CO out-of-sample in
the 2016-2019 seasons, and report our results in Table
5. While the model is successful in-sample, it fails to
maintain its profitability out-of-sample. Each strategy
is insignificantly greater than a 50% wins-to-bets ratio
out-of sample, indicating that strategies based on our
regression model are unlikely to perform better than
random without the inclusion of additional significant
factors, if they exist. This result runs counter to the
findings of several previous authors (Gray & Gray 1997,
Wever & Aadland 2012, Osborne 2001), who likewise
discovered evidence of nonrational expectations, but si-
multaneously found that out-of-sample profit opportu-
nities resulted. It may be that the pointspread market
bookmakers have since adjusted their pricing strate-
gies as to avoid profit opportunities, despite gamblers’
continued biases, or that such findings were spurious.
Strong evidence of nonrational expectations are
present in the data despite apparently effcient prices,
a curious result when considering the typical consen-
sus of rational expectations as a prerequisite for mar-
ket effciency. The data clearly indicates nonrational
expectations, but simultaneously offers no evidence of
ineffciency; either the market is effcient despite crowd
irrationality, and rational expectations of agents are
not a prerequisite for market effciency, or the tests used
thus far are too weak to detect ineffciency.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents several empirical tests of efficiency
and rationality in the NFL pointspread betting market.
We observe nonrational expectations of gamblers, but
market behavior is consistent with a semi-strong EMH.
Neither statistical nor economic tests reject market ef-
ficiency despite the discernable biases that we detect.
We also fail to find evidence of supposedly profitable
betting strategies proposed by other authors.
Our tests yield results quite similar to those of
Summers (1986), who finds that even when simulating
securities price movements with built-in nonrational
expectations of agents, efficiency could not be rejected
with standard statistical tests. Likewise, Gulko (2005)
provides evidence that a semi-strong EMH holds in
the bond market despite that market participants ig-
nore relevant information when issuing interest rate
forecasts. While Summers (1986) concludes that in-
vestors’ failure to detect serially correlated mispricing
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is due to the weakness of the tests he employs, those
presented here yield the same results despite compa-
rably greater power against the null of efficiency. It
seems rather more likely that irrational agents coex-
ist with an efficient pointspread betting market. Con-
sidering the numerous similarities between securities
trading and the pointspread market, traditional finan-
cial markets might likewise experience the efficiency-
without-rationality phenomenon.
The observed disconnect between irrationality and
inefficiency is surprising, although not inconsistent
with patterns shown in other markets. Repeated stud-
ies have found significant biases and heuristics present
in all manner of economic actors, yet long-run market
efficiency tends to hold. Gambler behavior significantly
differs from rational expectations, but long-run prof-
itability is still close to or less than 0. Several expla-
nations could exist: an elementary market structure,
entry barriers, transaction costs imposed by market-
makers, bettors’ derivation of utility from nonmone-
tary sources, and discounting of price risk could all be
factors. Nevertheless, the results of this study suggest
that even in lieu of rational, profit-maximizing agents,
certain markets might still be efficient.
Conventional economic thought assumes rational
expectations of agents to be a necessary condition for
the efficient markets hypothesis, however, the evidence
we present suggests otherwise. It may be that the
traditional neoclassical efficient markets framework is
more compatible with irrationality than once thought.
In any case, the evidence presented here from the NFL
pointspread market certainly warrants a reexamination
of the relationship between rational expectations and
efficiency in financial markets.
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